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Abstract 
 
The necessity to certify one's identity for different 
purposes and the evolution of  mobile technologies 
have led to the generation of electronic devices such 
as smart cards, and electronic identities designed to 
meet  daily  needs.  Nevertheless,  these  mechanisms 
have a problem: they don't allow the user to set the 
scope  of  the  information  presented.  That  problem 
introduces  interesting  security  and  privacy 
challenges and  requires  the development of a  new 
tool that supports user-centrity for the information 
being handled. This article presents eIDeCert, a tool 
for the management of electronic identities (eIDs) in 
a mobile environment with a user-centric approach. 
Taking  advantage  of  existing  eCert  technology  we 
will be able to solve a real problem. On the other 
hand,  the  application  takes  us  to  the  boundary  of 
what the technology can cope with: we will assess 
how  close  we  are  to  the  boundary,  and  we  will 
present an idea of what the next step should be to 
enable us to reach the goal. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent  improvements  in  technology  have  made 
possible  the  creation  of  new  forms  of  support, 
usually electronic, for personal data management that 
is  more  efficient  and  reliable  than  those  which 
existed previously. Electronic identity (eID) aims to 
replace  paper-based  documents,  thereby  providing 
improved portability and durability. For example, a 
spilt cup of coffee could invalidate our passport. In 
some contexts, the possibility exists for the user to 
decide what information should be made public, thus 
supporting  a  user-centric  approach  to  sensitive 
information  management.  Unfortunately,  current 
technologies  don’t  support  user-centricity 
effectively. Moreover, these types of support raise a 
wide variety of issues relating mainly to security. In 
this  context,  the  provision  of  a  specialized 
eCertificate  which  controls  access  to  private 
information is required. To gain maximum advantage 
from the eID concept,  we  may use it on a  mobile 
device.  This  idea  adds  other  security  issues  to 
existing  problems  and  at  the  time  of  writing  this 
article,  only  a  few  limited  solutions  have  been 
proposed. 
Taking advantages from the eCert project [2], an 
innovative project developed by Learning Societies 
Laboratory in Southampton's School of Electronics 
and Computer Science and focused on the creation of 
an  eCertificates,  we  have  been  able  to  guarantee 
prevention  of  forgery,  provision  of  privacy  and 
interoperability in the eID context developing a new 
specific tool: eIDeCert. The following pages present 
the life-cycle that has allowed us to reach the goal. 
Starting from the theoretical analysis, we will show 
how  eIDeCert  has  been  developed.  Moreover,  we 
will underline the limits and advantages that come 
from the use of this approach. 
An exemplifying scenario. Consider the following 
situation: UserX goes out clubbing and has to certify 
his age to enter. Unfortunately his wallet is untidy 
and it contains a lot of smart cards, other IDs, but not 
that one that the UserX needs. Disconsolate, UserX 
comes back home. Observe that with paper ID, users 
are forced to disclose all the sensitive information on 
the ID, not only the age. 
More  than  95%  of  the  citizens  in  developed 
countries  owns  a  mobile  phone  [3].  As  a 
consequence,  eCert  for  eID  managed  in  mobile 
devices proposes itself as the tool able to be always 
available and to provide a huge variety of ID in order 
to  avoid  the  previous  scenario.  According  to  [4], 
“One way to protect sensitive information is for the 
card not to reveal it at all but just to verify certain 
assertions”, or in other words a major goal for eID 
card is to support all those security features which 
increase  the  control  of  the  card owner  over  which 
data are disclosed about them and to whom. This is 
exactly the main focus of our user-centric approach 
that we will discuss in details in the next sections. 
 
2. Underlying technologies 
 
The  eID  exploits  and  leverages  some  key 
technologies, such as:                                                                                                                                                                                   International Journal for Infonomics (IJI), Volume 4, Issue 1, Year 2011 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  2 
 
  eCertificate as policy for key management; 
  ePortfolio  to  understand  and  underpin  the 
choice about eCert; 
  eID to understand what it is and the related 
requirements; 
  Mobile agents as means to reach a big part of 
the  population  and  to  provide  portability, 
mobility,  scalability,  data  management  and 
identification and control.  
In  the  following  we  briefly  discuss  the  role  of 
these technologies in our proposed solution. 
 
2.1. eCertificate 
 
The  word  eCertificate  is  often  used  as 
synonymous  with  the  concept  of  Public  Key 
Infrastructure  (PKI).  A  PKI  provides  a  secure 
infrastructure based on authentication and proof of 
content.  Specifically  in  cryptography,  PKI  denotes 
the  authentication  managed  by  CA  (certification 
authority):  each  user  receives  a  public  key  bound 
with its unique identity through the registration and 
issuance  process  provided,  usually,  by  the 
certification  authority.  The  link  between  unique 
identity and the public key identifies unambiguously 
for each user a certainty in: 
  quality of information sent and received; 
  source and destination; 
  time and timing characterizing information; 
  privacy; 
  legal trustworthiness; 
Thus  PKI  ensures  confidentiality,  integrity  and 
availability with consideration to possible changes of 
hardware, software, data, policy and people. 
 
2.2. ePortfolio 
 
The  Southampton  eCert  project  is  focused  on 
providing user-centric control of personal data within 
the context of ePortfolios (EPs). The term ePortfolio 
identifies  a  digitalized  collection  of  artifacts  that 
represent an institution, group or an individual. The 
EP possibilities go beyond the previous definition: it 
can be used as an administrative tool (to manage and 
organize  work),  to  monitor  access  to  private 
information  and  it  can  be  used  as  a  means  for 
exchanging ideas and feedback. The structure of an 
ePortfolio (collection of files) isn’t directly linked to 
the eID structure, which is a collection of text-line 
information, but its idea is quite close to that of eID: 
both  EP  and  eID  have  to  find  an  electronic  and 
secure way to certify, set and show the users' private 
information.  This  feature  underpins  the  eCert 
protocol  which  is  designed  to  manage  ePortfolios, 
providing security in this field of e-Learning. 
 
 
2.3. eID 
 
Just as the ePortfolio is proposed as a substitute of 
the  paper-based  portfolio,  the  eID  guarantees  the 
same functionalities as an ID card. Usually an eID is 
a plastic smart-card (like a bank card) that provides 
personal  user  identification  through  a  microchip 
containing  information.  The  electronic  side  of  this 
support  consists  of  authentication  and  requires  a 
document to be signed with a digital signature. This 
paper presents a secure protocol for eID management 
which is completely electronic: it allows the user to 
set  a  scope  for  his  information,  provide  security 
through  the  migration  of  the  eCert  protocol,  and 
mobility through the use of mobile devices. 
 
2.4. Mobile agents 
 
We envision a mobile solution based on mobile 
agents (MAs) implemented on mobile phones. A MA 
is  a  software  agent  which  can  transport  its  state 
between  different  environments  without  loss  of 
features.  More  specifically  a  mobile  agent  is 
autonomous,  self-taught  (with  respect  to  its 
environment) and mobile. 
Security problems for MA include the protection 
of  the  Agent  Execution  Environment  (AEE)  from 
malicious agents, of agents from a malicious AEE, of 
one  agent  from  another,  of  an  AEE  from  another 
AEE, of the communication to and from the AEE, 
and of the host from the AEE. In order to solve these 
problems we could use the principles shown in [1]: 
  for the most natural applications of MA, the 
participants cannot be assumed to trust one 
another, 
  any agent-critical decisions should be made 
on neutral (trusted) hosts, 
  unchanging  components  of  the  state  should 
be sealed cryptographically. 
The  eCert  central  system  provides  the  same 
features.  Thus  the  migrated  eCert  technology  is 
sufficient to guarantee these principles in practice. 
 
2.5. Existing systems 
 
There  are  many  examples  of  eID  applications. 
They include the following: 
Identification  eID:  is  a  government-issued 
document  for  online  and  offline  identification. 
Usually this type of document allows digital signing 
and uses a chip which contains the same information 
legible  on  the  card  plus  information  for  the 
identification  like  signature  key  and  certificates. 
Examples  are  the  biometrical  passport
 [5]  and  the 
italian CIE [6] (electronic identity card): the first one 
is  a  combination  of  paper  and  electronic  ID  that 
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Access badge (private eID): is used for entry to 
reserved areas managed by automated access control. 
It  can  be  equipped  with  various  technologies,  but 
usually uses barcodes or magnetic stripes to carry an 
identification number. An example of this type is the 
IDcard  [7]  for  the  students  of  Southampton 
University. This card provides authentication for all 
the universitary stuff, including the public transport. 
Financial eID: can be defined as a "middle way" 
between  the  previous  two.  The  mechanism  of 
authentication  is  close  to  an  access  badge 
(authentication  through  an  automated  control  with 
magnetic stripe) but the new eIDs belonging to this 
group  has  a  chip  that  contains  all  the  private 
information  of  the  user.  Moreover  the  process  of 
authentication  is  made  stronger  by  the  use  of  a 
personal  secure  number  (PIN).  Bank  cards  [8]  are 
typical examples of this category. 
Each  type  of  eID  analyzed  provides  security, 
authentication, and has a track record in the security 
field.  Moreover  they  use  the  same  cryptography 
model that the developers would use for the project, 
so we have to think: what is the innovation inside the 
project? Why could it become a useful tool for the 
day  life?  The  answers  are:  mobility  and 
customizability. None of the previous eID examples 
allow the user to set a scope for his data and no one 
has an implementation usable by mobile. The project 
shown in this paper aims to reach both this goals and, 
in this sense, it's a very innovative project. 
 
3. eCert protocol 
 
The eCert project is a UK government-sponsored 
project  [9].  At  the  heart  of  this  project  is  an 
eCertification protocol which is being developed to 
address  security  issues  which  originally  arose  as  a 
concern within the field of ePortfolios. The project 
aims  to  implement  an  electronic  version  of  a 
Qualification  Certificates  System,  which  will 
overcome  the  authorization  problems  that  we  are 
facing in ePortfolios. This eCertificate system will be 
at least as valid as the paper-based certificates, and 
will be usable either as a standalone application or 
served within other applications, such as ePortfolios. 
eCert aims to be easy to use and suit all levels of 
students  while  including  high  security  methods  to 
prevent  forgery.  The  system  is  designed  with  user 
centric  approach,  such  that  the  students  will  have 
control over the usage of such eCertificates lifelong. 
With  the  provided  verification  service,  the  whole 
system is secured, not just the eCertificate. 
The  eCert  policy  is  alredy  integrated  and 
operative the UK ePortfolio system called “eFolio”, 
and an Australian system, the Mahara. Both systems 
can now be fully utilized and it is possible to prove 
the  usage  of  the  system  successfully  as  it  can  not 
only be used standalone but can also be plugged into 
other applications.  The eCert system’s accessibility 
and scalability have also been improved after taking 
a  considerable  number  of  observations  and 
recommendations from this subproject. 
The  concept  of  the  eCert  protocol  needs  to  be 
evaluated to test its usage in a wider domain. For this 
reason,  it  seems  a  good  idea  to  leverage  the  UK 
government  user-centric  structure  of  eCert  for 
ePortofolios  to  achieve  the  creation  of  a  new 
protocol with similar features but focused on eID in 
the mobile environment. 
 
3.1. Overview 
 
eCert divides the system stakeholders into three 
categories, together with the eCert server, form the 
four  actors  of  the  system;  their  relationships  are 
defined and shown in figure 1: 
  the issuer is the entity that manages student 
records, provides and issues the eCert, after 
the user identification; 
  the owner is the entity that, if identification 
succeeds, receives eCert. Then he is able to 
set access control to his eCerts, and finally he 
can distribute them; 
  the  reviewer  is  the  entity  that  views  the 
information  provided  by  the  owner  and  he 
checks if they are valid. 
  the  eCert  server:  is  the  entity  that  provides 
services for issuer to issue, owner to manage, 
and  reviewer  to  verify  eCerts,  it  provides 
security control and support functions for the 
services. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. eCert actors and relations 
The  actors  interact  each  other  through  the 
processes shown in figure. The eCert issuer creates 
an eCert through the issuing subsystem, and issues it 
to the owner.  The owner can set access control to 
the  eCert  before  distribute  it  out  to  the  reviewer. 
Finally  the  reviewer  communicates  with  the  eCert 
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checking  the  validity  of  information.  The  issuer 
updates  the  verification  related  information  at 
anytime  during  the  process.  It  contains  a  request 
requesting  the  checking  process  and 
acknowledgement  (confirming  the  document’s 
validity and showing the eCert). 
eCert  aims  to  secure  the  whole  e-certificate 
system, not just the eCertificate itself. We now show 
how to reach this goal. 
 
3.2. Structure and functionalities 
 
The eCert structure provides central services, but 
requires user-orientated storage. It is composed of an 
issuing subsystem and an online central system. The 
issuing  subsystem  is  for  installed  within  registered 
education  institutions  only;  and  the  online  central 
system  is  in  turn  composed  of  an  management 
subsystem  and  an  verification  subsystem.    The 
management  subsystem  is  for  eCert  owners  to  set 
access  control  values  to  their  eCerts,  and  the 
verification subsystem is for reviewers to verify the 
received eCerts. This solution is able to guarantee a 
unique standard for all issuing institution; issuer side: 
signs the documents with his private key, encrypts 
the whole document with system private key, issue 
the  documents  to  the  owners’  corresponding 
institution  accounts,  and  update  the  verification 
related  information  to  the  central  system  (e.g. 
revokes a document that it was withdrawn); owner 
side: sets the access info’s through an access token 
contained  into  the  XML  metadata  and  sends  the 
eDocument  to  reviewer;  reviewer  side:  uses  the 
online service and the access token for verifying the 
genuine  of  the  eDocument.  Figure2  shows  the 
structure. 
 
 
Figure 2. eCert system 
The  eCert  policy  also  provides  the  following 
functionalities that aim to solve the problems related 
to the chosen architecture: 
  each owner has one and only one system ID 
that  acquires  at  the  moment  of  first 
registration  into  the  system  and  it  has  a 
lifetime-duration. It must be attached in each 
owner's information;  
  the issuers have to be certified to avoid that 
fake  issuers  are  present  into  the  system. 
Moreover all the member that belong to an 
issuer have to be certified also;  
  owner: system ID relation is 1:1;  
  system ID: eCert relation is 1:many;  
  the  central  system  has  to  maintain  a 
revocation list for all issued eCerts that may 
be uploaded by the institutions.  
 
3.3. eCert system design summary  
 
The  eCert  project  addressed  the  eCertificate 
problem  that  exists  with  in  the  traditional  digital 
signing  method  when  it  is  applied  to  non  static 
content eDocuments, such as eCertificates; it defined 
the eCertificate file structure, so that it contain not 
only the qualification award information, but also the 
transcript  information  and  any  supported  evidence 
files, which can be in any format; it has proposed a 
new  digital  signing  method  to  cooperate  with  the 
designed  structure  and  to  meet  the  eDocuments’ 
ownership right.  
The  new  signing  method  not  only  bound  the 
related files together, but also allow the eCertificate 
owners to set access control value of who can see 
what  and  for  how  long  to  the  signed  eDocument, 
while  remaining  the  integrity  of  the  signature, 
without the need of resigning by the initial issuing 
body; an additional encrypt key will be added after 
the signing to ensure that only the receiver with the 
corresponding decrypt key can access the file; it has 
also  proposed  a  newly  designed  centralized 
verification  service  for  such  digitally  signed  and 
access controlled distributed eCertificates.  
The  system  provides  security  control  for 
verification against eCertificate expire time, access 
period, ownership, signing  key status, qualification 
award status, owner controlled section display.  
The whole design cooperate together to enable the 
issued eCertificates can be securely distributed and 
verified  independently  from  the  issuing  body  and 
satisfy the ownership right, without requiring storage 
in the verification system,  these also provide huge 
advantages of lifetime validation and avoiding many 
of the database attacks. 
 
3.4. Advantages and disadvantages 
 
eCert  provides  a  unique,  secure  and  trusted 
system  for  the  management  of  data  in  a  web 
environment  with  a  secure  user-centric  approach. 
This user-centric focus is key to this project and a 
further advantage would be to consider this protocol 
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standard. On the other hand, the protocol is thought 
to  manage  ePortfolio  in  the  web  environment:  a 
reverse  engineering  process  to  adapt  the  system  is 
needed. Even if the ideas of EP and eID are quite 
close, their structure is different: eCert is not able to 
manage  eID.  Furthermore,  the  issue  process  is 
different  in  terms  of  the  data  transmitted  and  the 
execution  environment.  These  issues  will  now  be 
analyzed. 
 
4. Design 
 
The  idea  of  an  eID  managed  in  mobile 
environments constitutes a powerful and innovative 
tool  to  manage  personal  identity  in  an  easy  and 
comfortable  way,  but  it  offers  many  security 
challenges as that to guarantee security in the whole 
the process. In order to do this it is clear that: 
  reviewer has to be able to verify the identity 
and the validity of the document shown; 
  the  owner  has  to  be  able  to  show  only  the 
information  that  he  wants  to  show  (in  this 
case date of birth) and he has to be able to 
manage the access to this information; 
  the issuer has to be trusted to manage a huge 
quantity  of  information  and  to  sign  its 
document with the eCert policy. 
Apart from the security and adaptation issues, we 
have to consider a technical problem related to the 
mobile environment: to find a good and quick way to 
pass the eID to the reviewer. Two possible solutions 
were  considered,  NFC  [10]  and  qr  code  [11]. 
Although  the  two  means  are  equally  efficient,  the 
increasing popularity of qr codes and the availability 
of  a  qr  reader  within  mobile  devices  support  the 
choice of the qr code over NFC. 
Figure 3 gives the use case diagram for eID eCert: 
 
 
Figure 3. Use case diagram 
 
4.1. eID vs eCert 
 
The  review  of  the  underlying  technologies 
identified that the idea of EP is quite close to eID in 
that both need to find an electronic and secure way to 
certify  and  show  the  users'  information.  Although 
eCert  provides  secure  eCertificates  in  the  web 
environment, studies on eCert  and in the literature 
point out that it can’t be directly applied to eID for 
two reasons; differences in the file structure and the 
existence  of  a  personal  account.  eCert  is  a  stand-
alone system, but it has been created to manage EPs 
and  this  feature  is  evident  in  the  structure  of  the 
managed files. 
 
 
Figure 4. (a) eCert file; (b) eID-eCert file 
The  eCert  files  are  a  collection  of  files, 
individually  signed,  and  encrypted  together  with 
metadata that makes it possible to set a file’s scope. 
Instead  the  eID  files  are  a  collection  of  line-text 
information  gathered  in  a  single  signed  file  and 
encrypted  together  with  metadata  that  makes  it 
possible  to  set  the  scope  of  this  information.  This 
problem is related to the code of the issue process: a 
recoding  is  sufficient  to  make  the  system  able  to 
recognize  the  eID  file.  Thus,  the  recoding  aims  to 
make able the system to use the structure in figure 
4.(b) instead the structure in figure 4.(a). Note that 
with the notation “settable” we set the visibility for 
that  element  of  the  file:  other  files  in  the  case  of 
eCert, and text-line information in the case of eID. 
The second difference is related to the nature of 
the  information:  the  original  protocol  allows  the 
issuing  institution  to  have  an  account  for  each 
eCertificate  owner  in  order  to  manage  his 
information.  In  the  eID,  this  step  is  unnecessary 
because  it  is  reasonable  to  think  that  personal 
information like DOB (date of birth) is valid for a 
person’s life-time. This issue mans we need to find a 
way to supply the lack of an account and thus, secure 
the eID-eCert on mobile devices. We therefore need 
a  new  encryption  method  to  straighten  the  issue 
process between issuer and owner without using an 
intermediary  account.  In  this  sense,  AES-128  [12] 
seems the best possible choice. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   International Journal for Infonomics (IJI), Volume 4, Issue 1, Year 2011 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  6 
 
4.2. Using eCert’s solutions in eID 
 
In  order  to  guarantee  security,  eCert  employs 
additional features beyond the basic architecture with 
a  central  service  and  no  central  storage.  Some  of 
these must be maintained for the eID system.  
About the assertion techniques: 
  an XML signature can be used to encapsulate 
the  documents  in  order  to  have  an  issuer's 
secure signature; 
  XML metadata: the ownership information of 
an eCert can be stored in XML metadata and 
meanwhile the employee can create an eCert 
through the XML signature method; 
  revocation lists: a check of information status 
is  required.  In  fact  if  the  key  has  been 
compromised  or  the  information  has  been 
withdrawn, the system has to deny the access; 
  auto  request:  the  Certificate  validation 
processes has to start automatically before the 
verification results are ready; 
  timestamp:  can  also  be  added  the  XML 
Signatures to improve the security. 
Concerning the privacy techniques, we may use 
the eCert signature method [2]. 
Regarding the lifetime validation techniques, the 
eCert central system provides a verification service 
for eCertificates issued throughout the UK. It would 
be  ideal  for  solving  the  lifetime  validation  issue. 
Adopting  this  solution,  we  need  to  take  care  to 
consider the mass of stored data: in fact it implies 
that all the issued information should be stored in the 
central system. 
 
5. Development  
 
In the following, we are using the name eID to 
indicate  the  data  to  protect  and  eID-eCert  for  the 
protected data (eID file).Note that the issuer and the 
central system have the same cryptographic method, 
so all encrypted data sent by the owner is accessible 
by the central system. 
 
5.1. Issue process 
 
The  issue  process  for  eID  exploits  the  same 
validation  and  creation  processes  as  eCert  for 
eCertificate.  After  the  user  (owner)  request,  the 
issuer gathers the owner’s information, sets an initial 
(default)  access  control  and  applies  his  signature 
(with his private key). This component is the eID. 
Afterwards, the issuer uses the system AES-128 key 
to encrypt the eID and obtain eID-eCert. The use of a 
single system key is possible considering the features 
of  AES  and  the  security  of  the  system  (we  will 
develop  it  on  a  server):  indeed,  if  the  system  is 
compromised,  to  steal  a  key  or  more  than  one 
presents the same level of complexity, because the 
operation  of  scan  a  list  of  keys  is  not  really 
expensive  in  terms  of  computational  complexity. 
Finally,  the  issuer  updates  the  central  system 
revocation list. 
 
5.2. Manage process 
 
The  owner  logs  in  to  access  the  management 
system  sending  his  eID-eCert.  The  central  system 
looks for the validation of the signature, so, first of 
all it decrypts the file and then checks the signature. 
Moreover it is able to verify ownership, revocation 
and    modification  of  eID-eCert.  If  the  validation 
succeeds,  the  owner  is  able  to  interact  with  the 
central  system  in  order  to  set  a  scope  for  the 
information. Again, the use of a single system key 
allows us to skip the original step of generation of a 
new key pairs (PKI) for the management. In fact, the 
AES key is hidden in the central system and we can 
use  this  feature  to  recognize  if  a  user  has  the 
authorization  to  view  the  information  or  not.  That 
will be clear in the implementation paragraph. When 
the  owner  has  set  a  new  visibility  for  the 
information, .the central system generates a qr_code 
that contains the eID with the new scope. This image 
is then sent to the owner that can distribute the eID 
toward the reviewer (human or not).  
 
5.3. Distribute and verify process 
 
The owner shows the qr code to the reviewer. The 
latter one uploads the qr code (through scanning) to 
central  system  that  decrypts  the  eID-eCert  and 
verifies  revocation,  modification  and  validation.  If 
the checking is positive, the central system enables 
the  reviewer  to  view  the  eID  (with  the  user’s 
visibility setup), otherwise it sends an error message. 
We  call  the  act  of  giving  the  information  to  the 
reviewer  "sending",  but  actually  the  owner  shows, 
not send his data: in fact the reviewer, through the 
use of a barcode reader, scans the barcodes and, gets 
back the contained information on his phone. 
 
6. Implementation 
 
eIDeCert has been implemented on the Android 
[13] platform. This platform is open source and in 
future  its  market  could  be  a  good  testbed  for  this 
work. The core of the application, constituted by the 
eCert methods, is written in pure Java and linked to 
the Android interface with the use of PHP [14]. The 
latter one is used to build a web service that acts as 
central  system.  To  store  the  eID  information,  we 
have  used  mySQL  [15]  and  for  the  classes  design 
UML  [16].  The  methodology  used  for  the 
development  of  the  protocol  is  Agile  [17].  It  has 
been  very  useful  to  understand  the  real  user 
requirement  and  to  improve  it  through  a  constant 
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protocol and by experts  in  security  field. The first 
prototype of the application eIDeCert [18] turns out 
to be very powerful and applicable in a wide variety 
of scenarios (e.g. to prove own personal age, but also 
as  substitute  for  digital  access  cards  for  reserved 
areas).  
 
6.1. Issue process 
 
At  time  of  the  writing,  the  application  doesn’t 
have a real process of issuing. Mobile technologies 
are  reaching  new  high  levels  of  security,  but  it  is 
reasonable  to  think  that  we  can't  allow  the 
transmission  of  the  original  initial  eID-eCert  by 
means of mobile phone. If an attack succeeds in this 
step,  the  whole  process  will  be  compromised.  So, 
how  does  the  issuing  happen?  The  development 
skips this step, because in order to prove the concept, 
we  can  assume  without  lack  of  generality  that  the 
owner has his file ready for the  management step. 
The  idea  for  the  future  is  to  use  a  mechanism 
equivalent to internet banking: 
  the  owner  needs  to  fill  in  a  request  form 
giving  personal  information  and 
unmistakably certifying his identity;  
  the  entity  that  manages  the  central  DB, 
verifies the accuracy of the information and 
creates the eID-eCert; 
  the eID-eCert is sent by mail to the owner; 
  the  owner  receives  the  file  together  with 
other security information (PIN or other) that 
could be used to obtain a new eID-eCert in 
case of a problem with the first one (robbery, 
damage, etc). 
Note  that  we  have  also  developed  the  code  to 
generate the file (for the tests), so, in the future, it 
will be very easy to develop the issuing process. 
 
6.2. Manage process 
 
Selecting from the main menu the button “manage 
your  eID”  (figure  5),  we  can  perform  the  actions 
described previously. In detail, this step is composed 
of three sub-actions: 
  send eID-eCert: the user inserts the path and 
the name of the encrypted (and signed) eID 
and sends it to the server for validation; 
  set  the  visibility  for  the  information:  if  the 
validation  succeeds,  the  server  enables  the 
interface  to  show  a  new  layout  (figure  5) 
where the user can select the information to 
visualize,  otherwise  an  error  message  is 
given. The layout is intuitive through the use 
of  check  boxes.  Moreover  there  is  the 
possibility  to  set  a  timer  for  the  validity 
(visualization time for the reviewer) for the 
chosen information; 
  qr  code  generation:  after  sending  the  scope 
and  the  time  validity  values  to  the  central 
system, the server generates and sends back a 
qr code that contains a link to the information 
on the server. The qr code is shown in a new 
layout. 
Note, the final step in this process is significant in 
that it goes against the underlying philosophy of the 
eCert  protocol  that  underpins  eIDeCert,  but  it  is 
necessary  for  now  in  order  to  prove  the  principle, 
due to the limitations of qr codes. 
 
 
      Figure 5. eIDeCert: Manage your eID 
Each part of this step is designed to be easy for 
the user. We have considered the possibility that the 
user  may  have  different  level  of  skills.  Thus,  the 
interaction  needs  to  be  simple,  intuitive  and  clear. 
The interface guarantees these features. Concerning 
the  qr  code  management,  we  have  provided  the 
possibility  to  save  the  image  on  the  phone:  this 
feature allows the user to show the eID even without 
internet connection and several time later.  
 
6.3. Distribute and verify process 
 
To  distribute  the  eID,  the  owner  shows  the 
relative qr code image to the reviewer. The scanning 
happens  by  means  of  ZXing  qr  scanner  [19] 
developed by Google. We have used this project in 
our one because it allows us to generate and scan the 
qr codes with the same precision and the same code. 
After the scanning the application acquires the link 
inside the qr code and requests the validation for the 
information related to it. If the validation succeeds 
(the  process  is  the  same  described  in  the 
management process), the central system sends back 
an  xml  file  with  the  accessible  information  or  an 
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______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  8 
 
generate  a  layout  for  the  visualization  like  that 
shown  in  figure  6.  The  data  to  visualize  and  the 
counter are based on the scope set in the figure 5. 
The photograph doesn’t belong to the scope because 
it  is  obligatory:  that  intuition  allows  us  to  avoid 
security  issues  related  to  the  use  of  the  phone.  In 
other  words,  the  photo  avoids  misunderstandings 
related to ownership of the eID. 
 
 
      Figure 6. eIDeCert: Verify an eID  
The counter represents the length in time that the 
reviewer has for visualizing the information. At the 
end  of  it,  the  data  are  deleted  forever.  Finally  we 
have set another mechanism to prevent identity theft: 
when  a  layout  of  verification  is  built,  the  xml  is 
deleted.  Thus,  the  reviewer  is  not  able  to  use  the 
phone buttons home, back and menu to retrieve and 
save the xml. The interface is very easy and user-
centricity  persists:  the  information  and  the  counter 
were set by the owner and the reviewer can’t modify 
them.  
 
6.4. Trade off with the technologies 
 
Qr  codes  are  easy  to  use  and    and  fast  in 
operation.  This is a big advantages for the eID-eCert 
user  scenario,  but  it  is  also  a  problem.  This 
technology allows us to store inside an image just a 
limited number of characters or bytes as shown in 
table 1: 
 
Table 1. Qr code’s bound 
Numeric  7,089 characters 
Alphanumeric  4,296 characters 
Binary  2,953 bytes 
Kanji  1,817 characters 
Unfortunately, after a series of attempts we have 
realized  that  the  information  contained  in  an  eID-
eCert  are  too  much  to  respect  the  limits  of  the  qr 
codes. In the next years, with the evolution of these 
codes, we could solve the problem easily. In order to 
prove the concept, the qr code generated by eIDeCert 
contains  a  link  to  a  file  stored  on  the  server 
temporarily: that solution is against the eCert policy 
(no central system storage), but as said before we are 
counting  to  solve  that  conflict  as  soon  as  the  qr 
technologies allow us. 
 
7. Experimental Results 
 
The Mobile eID system has been implemented on 
the Android platform using a couple of HTC Desire 
(hones  and  Android  2.2,  although  any  smartphone 
running Android 2.2 should do). The system is easy 
to use and gives the participants confidence in the 
reliability of the data they can show and see. 
It has been necessary to compromise the design as 
originally envisaged in order to ensure that system 
will  work  reliably  in  practice.  However,  current 
technology is not far from being able to deliver what 
is required in full. 
A  set  of  twenty  representative  eIDs  have  been 
produced in each of three versions; a raw eID, the 
same eID but encrypted, and the eID encrypted and 
encoded in B64 format ready for use in a qr code. 
Table 2 gives the results. 
 
Table 2. eID code sizes 
 
Using a standard passport-style format, but minus 
the  picture,  we  can  expect  97.5%  of  all  likely 
required entries to produce a raw eID of 2417 bytes 
or less. Interestingly, the encrypted version of these 
eIDs is virtually identical, except that they have to 
round up to the nearest multiple of 8. In other words, 
encrypting  the  eID  incurs  no  additional  space 
demands, providing a full character set is available. 
However, if we wish to use text characters only, 
rather  than  a  full  character  set,  we  will  need  to 
encode using something like B64 encoding, and this 
increases  the  required  97.5%  upper  limit  to  3237 
bytes. 
This means that in theory, we should have space 
to  spare.  However,  the  mobile  phone  technology 
available to us becomes unreliable over about 1.5 to 
2K for alphanumeric codes, so in practice, we can't 
use  native eIDs - although  we are clearly close to 
being  able  to  do  so.  Although  we  have  had  to 
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in practice, next generation of phones will probably 
get us there. 
Including  an  ID  picture  in  the  eID  makes  a 
significant  difference.  International  passport 
regulations tend to specify a size for the user's photo, 
and although they allow for digital photos to be used, 
they  don't  specify  a  minimum  quality  in  terms  of 
pixels  or  colour-depth,  for  example.  The  file  size 
depends  heavily  on  the  file  format,  but  a  little 
investigation indicates that something like the jpeg 
format  yields  good  quality  with  small  file  sizes  – 
perhaps this is not surprising in view of its origin. 
Table 3 gives the results of an investigation of eID 
file sizes if a photo is included. 
 
Table 3. eID code sizes by photo size 
 
It  is  of  interest  to  note  that  the  relationship 
between photo size and final size of the eID would 
appear to follow a square law. For our purposes, this 
is not of major importance; what does matter is the 
quality of the photo. Without published criteria, it is 
necessary to assess this by eye; but there appears to 
be a marked difference between the 2K and the 3K 
versions. The 2K version is very small, whilst the 3K 
gives a usable photo in terms of recognition. 
From  the  table,  we  can  see  that  qr  code 
technology is still quite a way off being able to cope 
with a full eID with photo. It will be interesting to 
see what the new generation of NFC-enabled smart 
phones will allow - this could be a perfect answer for 
the immediate future. 
In  the  meantime,  the  mobile  eID  project 
demonstrates  just  how  usable  and  friendly  the 
concept is, and how it can give confidence to both 
user and reviewer in eCert terms. 
We may give a specification for our requirements 
for eID. Firstly, any technology we use needs to offer 
a maximum capacity of 2426 bytes if the data can be 
transferred in encrypted form, but 3237 if it needs to 
be transferred in B64 format. The standards say that 
qr  codes  can  cope  with  up  to  (about  4K),  but  in 
practice, the current qr technology on phones seems 
to become unreliable in the region of 1.5 to 2K, so 
we're  close  to,  but  over,  the  boundary  for  reliable 
text-only  transfers  of  the  full  eID.  Some  codes  of 
over 2K work reliably every time on the phone, but 
change a letter, or add a full stop, and suddenly it 
will never  work  – it becomes very fragile. With a 
very  small  photo  (2K)  included,  even  the  B64 
encrypted  version  is  quite  close  to  the  theoretical 
limit  of  the  qr  code.  The  quite  reasonable  quality 
medium-sized photo (3K) is not so very large when 
coded  up,  but  now  is  significantly  over  even  the 
current  theoretical  limit.  Yet  we  are  tantalizingly 
close to being able to implement a user-side storage 
version  of  the  eID  on  current  technology. 
Furthermore, this  year  we  may expect to see NFC 
phones  appearing,  which  would  be  an  alternative 
way to  solve the size problem.  
 
8. Conclusions and future work 
 
Initial results indicate a real possibility for using 
eCert  to  manage  eIDs  in  the  mobile  environment 
supporting  user-centric  management  of  sensitive 
information.  
We can distinguish between two types of possible 
improvement:  the  first  one  is  related  to  the 
improvement of the code and the second one related 
to  improvement  of  the  protocol  methodology.  In 
relation  to  the  methodological  issues,  it  will  be 
advisable  to  find  a  way  to  reduce  the  use  of  the 
central system (by reducing message exchanges and 
access into the DB) and, most importantly, to make 
an  identification  picture  for  each  eID  available,  in 
order to improve security and privacy. Concerning 
this category, a revocation list should be used that 
allows the system to recognize when an eID is not 
still  valid.  Finally  we  are  also  studying  the 
possibility to reduce the use of the keys in the system 
using  a  single  AES  key  instead  of  a  multiple 
approach. 
We plan to evaluate the usability of our system by 
using real testbeds. A possible testbed is related to 
access  to  alcoholic  drinks:  we  should  be  able  to 
certify age so that the salesman can be sure of that. 
Another  way  is  to  release  a  beta  version  on  the 
Android  market  and  wait  for  feedback  in  order  to 
improve the protocol. Finally we plan to submit the 
protocol to a group of security experts following the 
methodology  of  think  aloud  [20]  and  to  make 
improvements based on any suggestions offered.  
Finally, in the early months of 2011, eIDeCert has 
been  presented  to  the  World  Congress  on  Internet 
Security and to JISC 2011. The application has got 
genuine interest from the audiences and in general, 
the idea to have a flexible, always available and user-
centric eID has made the community enthusiastic and 
very favorable. 
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